15.Abstract: With the promise of war-winning efficiency, the effects-based operations (EBO) concept has rightly become the subject of intense joint study. For all this enthusiasm, however, operational commanders ultimately require more than the highly-theoretical EBO concepts. They also require a method of assessing, during a campaign's execution, whether or not the more sophisticated EBO approach is working. Unfortunately, the current ability to assess the success or failure of an effects-based campaign is far less mature than the EBO concept--this "assessment gap," then, prevents commanders from fully embracing EBO.
We couldn't afford distorted assessments: too much optimism could prompt us to launch the ground war too soon, at the cost of many lives; too much pessimism could cause us to sit wringing our hands and moaning that the enemy was still too strong. 1 
General Norman Schwarzkopf
One of the greatest challenges facing airmen remains that of assessment: how do we know if we are achieving our objectives? The problem has haunted airmen for decades, but seems little closer to solution than it was in World War II. 2 
Philip S. Meilinger
Joint Force Commanders (JFCs) design military campaigns, in concert with diplomatic, economic, and informational efforts, to meet the nation's strategic goals. In so doing, these commanders make judgments about both military objectives and the best method of achieving those objectives. None of this is new. What is new, however, are the expanded operational capabilities and concepts available to JFCs in the pursuit of the campaign's objectives. Today, the technological superiority of U.S. military forces, particularly in information systems, maneuver, precision and standoff weapons, and stealth capability, makes the adversary's national political, economic, informational, and military systems potentially vulnerable to lethal or non-lethal attack from the onset of hostilities. Thus, military commanders may achieve physical, functional, or psychological effects by methods never before available-at least, never available so early in a campaign or at such a low attritional cost for US, allied, or coalition forces. By attaining these desired effects, commanders may rapidly reduce, or completely eliminate, the adversary's ability or will to resist US, allied, or coalition demands, greatly shortening the conflict's duration. Developing and enhancing such methods is the focus of the effects-based operations (EBO) concept.
With the promise of war-winning efficiency, the EBO concept has rightly become the subject of intense joint study. For all this enthusiasm, however, operational commanders ultimately require more than the highly-theoretical EBO concepts. They also require a method of assessing, during a campaign's execution, whether or not the more sophisticated EBO approach is working. Unfortunately, the current ability to assess the success or failure of an effects-based operation is far less mature than the EBO concept. In part, one can easily understand this assessment void since the causal relationship between military action and effect is often indirect and ambiguous.
3 Still, the inherent difficulty in assessment cannot adequately explain why those charged with assessing effects, even in recent operations like DESERT STORM and ALLIED FORCE, were untrained and apparently incapable of attempting such assessments. 4 Given this paucity of assessment capability and, even more damning, the complete absence of an intellectual framework for the assessment process, JFCs remain only reluctant advocates of EBO-they tend to rely proportionately more on physical effects and distrust functional or psychological effects. Operational commanders perceive physical effects as measurable and objective-and hence, meaningful; functional or psychological effects are much less tangible-they are largely de-emphasized except in cases of abundant military resources. As a result, commanders miss opportunities to design the most efficacious military campaign. Is this "assessment gap" the Achilles heel of EBO?
Fundamentally, this analysis suggests that assessing effects in war has never been possible with the degree of clarity a commander desires; it is unlikely the current joint focus on technology, speed of information flow, maneuver, doctrine, and organizations will succeed in creating this clarity in the future-even for physical effects. It is most interesting that a guide for future JFACCs should so clearly admit the "tactical nature" of combat assessment. Such an admission is counter to airpower's traditional desire to rapidly achieve operational and strategic effects. JP 3-0's expanded definitions of combat assessment and battle damage assessment also point to a tactical focus. Specifically, JP 3-0's glossary describes combat assessment as being "composed of three major components: battle damage assessment, munitions effects assessment, and reattack recommendations." In turn, battle damage assessment is defined as "the timely and accurate estimate of damage resulting from the application of military force, either lethal or non-lethal, against a predetermined objective." 11 Chapter IV of JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, fails to emphasize combat assessment as a consideration "before combat" or "at the outset of combat." Instead, combat assessment is highlighted only during "sustained combat operations." assessment" concept improves over the "combat assessment" approach in three important ways. First, the new approach explicitly directs assessment efforts to evaluate, both objectively and subjectively, the campaign's ability to effectively link military efforts and endstate-that is, operational assessment assesses the commander's "method" in prosecuting the war. Second, this definition appropriately highlights the inextricable relationship between effectiveness and risk. Third, and most importantly, the new doctrinal definition orients the assessment process on the operational commander and his decision-making requirements.
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As a final foundational concept, this paper recognizes the intangible, but vital role of operational art in the development and execution of campaigns. While total mastery of operational art is a product of both natural ability-coup d'oeil-and hard work, effective campaign design can be guided by five key considerations as outlined in JP 3-0-ends, ways, means, risk, and the military exit strategy. 13 Perhaps, as this paper will suggest, this list lacks completeness; it does, however, provide a useful framework for the operational commander.
Four key assumptions underpin this analysis. 14 First, Clausewitzian concepts of uncertainty and interaction in war remain exceedingly relevant. Thus, any pragmatic approach to operational assessment and campaign design requires a focus on bounding uncertainty, not eliminating it. Second, the EBO concept applies broadly, across all instruments of national power-this paper, however, addresses only the military instrument.
12 Some may criticize this approach by suggesting the current Commander's Critical Information Requirements or CCIRs satisfy the operational commander's decision-making needs, enabling him to properly anticipate the enemy and future campaign direction. The author argues throughout this text that such a view ignores recent history. 13 Joint Publication 3-0, II-3. Specifically, JP 3-0 lists the five questions as follows: (1) what military (or related political and social) conditions must be produced in the operational area to achieve the strategic goal? (ends); (2) what sequence of actions is most likely to produce that condition? (ways); (3) How should the resources of the joint force be applied to accomplish that sequence of actions? (means); (4) how the CBO planners chose to achieve air superiority reveals much about EBO and the operational assessment challenge. First, planners selected the ball-bearing industry as the focus of strategic bombing efforts. Such a target set was attractive to planners not only because its destruction would prevent aircraft production and hamper war-making capability in general, but also because it was a small, concentrated, high-payoff target set. Indeed, postwar interviews with Albert Speer, the German Minister of Munitions, indicated the correctness of the ball-bearing target set: "armaments production would have been critically weakened after two months and after four months would have been brought completely to a standstill." 18 These raids, however, proved prohibitively costly and ineffective. Air planners next shifted their sights to the German aircraft production plants. Again, this method was unsuccessful in eliminating the German air threat. Instead, Germany actually increased fighter production, achieving peak production in the summer of 1944. 19 Ultimately, the Allies gained the "air superiority" effect through attrition battles in the air. But, it was not the attrition of aircraft that mattered; instead, it was the attrition of trained, experienced pilots.
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What lessons from this historical case, then, remain relevant? First, correct knowledge about how to achieve the desired effect, like the ball-bearing targeting during the CBO, is always a wholly insufficient condition for success. The target set must also be viable and vulnerable-viable such that mission accomplishment remains within acceptable risk levels and vulnerable such that available weapons are capable of achieving the desired effect against the target. Second, effects-based planning invariably involves assumptions. As World War II air planners redirected bomber efforts toward the aircraft industry, actual results fell far short of expectations. In part, airpower's underperformance was due to the target set's relative invulnerability. More significant, however, were the air planners' complete underestimation of German aircraft production capability and the industriousness of its people. Thus, today's planners must exercise care when making assumptions about enemy capability and will.
Third, even when desired effects are objectively measurable, commanders may not be attuned to the assessment process enough to act upon the knowledge. Air planners in World War II clearly recognized air attacks against the ball-bearing and aircraft industries were failing to arrest German fighter production-"production-wastage differential" continued to favor the Germans. 21 Despite signs of this "failure," though, the CBO continued its attacks on aircraft industry. Commanders, then, must not only demand, but also focus on operational assessments-ignoring such assessments prevents the commander from improving the 22 Additionally, commanders must understand the potentially debilitating effects of doctrine. In this example, for instance, it is likely air planners understood the ineffectiveness of their efforts. However, they knew no other way to proceed, since interwar-period airpower doctrine allowed for only two means to gain air superiority-(1) attacks against aircraft on the ground, airfields, and aircraft industry and (2) using the bomber's self-defense capability to defeat any enemy air still flying. See McFarland, page 83. 23 In reality, then, any bomber sorties in the German homeland would enable pilot attrition, achieving the air superiority effect. Not recognizing this situation prevented air planners from refocusing bombing efforts to more lucrative targets in early 1944-perhaps against the German oil industry. As a result, the CBO, while effective, was not particularly efficient. and "other" effects seems overdrawn; physical effects, too, suffer from a lack of fidelity in the assessment process.
The analysis of this limited-objective war highlights two additional concepts regarding operational assessment-(1) the rising sensitivity of campaign design to assessment considerations and (2) 33 In deference to General Schwarzkopf, his campaign adequately planned for the RGFC destruction through his "left-hook" plan. He brilliantly understood that ejecting the enemy from Kuwait and simultaneously destroying that force was exceedingly difficult. For in the limited-war context, once Kuwait was liberated, it was quite possible the political leadership might stop operations before the RGFC was destroyed-Schwarzkopf had to design his campaign correctly to meet both objectives. 34 Keaney, 79. Experience in limited conflicts such as DESERT STORM also indicates the relative importance assigned to low-risk, rapid, and high-payoff functional and psychological effects, particularly against the "leadership target." The campaign placed great emphasis on changing behavior in the adversary's regime. Judging the efficacy of such effects, however, proved inherently difficult. In fact, the full impact of these psychological effects remains shrouded in mystery. As the GWAPS Summary Report aptly stated: Keaney, 117. 38 This discussion naturally begs the question: Can psychological effects be "war-winning" independently?
ALLIED FORCE may not have answered this question directly, but it certainly pointed toward the edge of the envelope for the efficacy of psychological effects. Political constraints allowed only the use of airpower; airpower limits and self-imposed restraints prevented North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces from compelling the halting of Serbian aggression in Kosovo; and, the theory of victory, therefore, can best be described as attacking Serbia proper, not to destroy Serbia or its infrastructure, but to coerce Slobodan Milosevic's compliance with NATO war aims. In other words, the theory of victory relied heavily on psychological effects. By all accounts, success was a close run thing-one may never know why Milosevic complied with NATO desires. Psychological effects, then, are inherently difficult to assess, potentially powerful force multipliers, and best, not as a stand-alone effort, but when integrated in a campaign's design. 
Bridging the Operational Assessment Gap-Designing the EBO Campaign

Fifth, JFCs must view operational assessment as a critical operational art consideration during campaign design, execution, and post-hostilities analysis-not just the latter.
Institutionalizing these perspectives on operational assessment requires formal action, development of a useful conceptual framework, and commander involvement.
Three formal actions-in this case, amendments to joint doctrine-are recommended.
First, the joint community should adopt the term operational assessment as defined herein-it develops the critical mindset shift necessary for change. Second, Chapter II of JP 3-0 currently recommends that operational commanders consider a series of five questions during campaign design. 39 These questions, as written, fail to emphasize operational assessmentthus, the first two questions should be modified to read (changes are italicized for emphasis):
• What military (or related political and social) conditions must be produced in the operational area to achieve the strategic goal and what criteria suggest those conditions have been met?
• What sequence of actions is most likely to produce that condition and how can the efficacy of those actions be continually assessed?
Re-crafting these questions in this manner emphasizes the importance of operational assessment during campaign design, execution, and post-war analysis. Finally, Chapter IV of JP 3-0 should reinforce this mindset by adding operational assessment to its recommendations for "considerations before combat" and "considerations at the outset of combat."
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Even with those formal actions in place, JFCs and staffs require a conceptual framework for integrating operational assessment into campaign development and execution.
And, as with all operational art, any useful framework inherently stresses "how" to think As always, operational commanders determine the military conditions necessary to meet political guidance. But the first critical step in striving for the most efficacious campaign is to think beyond objectives and consider effects. 41 Inevitably, this approach yields multiple pathways toward the successful accomplishment of a given effect-physical, functional, and psychological pathways are likely. 42 Following this analysis, each pathway should be assessed against temporal requirements-requirements agreed to by political leaders. This step asks, "Must the effect be permanent or only temporary?" Ultimately, this consideration ensures the JFC's campaign plan begins in harmony with the desired political endstate. Finally, this first step validates each action is acceptable (in terms of risk), feasible, and in concert with any constraints and restraints.
Step one, then, identifies effects that are both congruent with political objectives and offer potential from a military perspective. 41 In framing the campaign's objectives, the commander and staff are simply defining the outcome that must be accomplished in the operational area. In identifying desired effects, on the other hand, the JFC and staff expand their analysis to consider not only the outcome but also the possible causal mechanisms to that outcome. Such an analysis also stresses both enemy capabilities and enemy will or behavior. 42 For example, the CBO in World War II sought to achieve the effect of air superiority (or, some would consider the effect better stated as "providing friendly forces freedom of maneuver"). Multiple actions were attempteddestroying ball-bearing factories, destroying aircraft industries, achieving attrition through aerial combat-and each had a different notion of the causal mechanism for success-respectively, destroying spare parts, destroying production capability, destroying aircraft in the air. 
Figure 1: Operational Assessment Framework
Step two focuses on designing an assessment scheme for each desired effect. Its purpose is to define assessment criteria, align assessment capabilities to fill those requirements, and orient the JFC on the key assessments for his future decision-making. To begin, the staff determines whether an effect is measurable with objective criteria. For effects meeting this criterion, the measure is clearly documented. On the other hand, effects defying objective measure are further analyzed to create a valid measurement approach. The staff may consider three approaches: (1) re-define the effect so as to allow an objective measure;
(2) define the measure in terms of friendly capability rather than enemy capability; or (3) develop subjective indicators.
43 Indicators, herein, are defined as any actions or inactions by 43 One should select the first approach only rarely and with extreme caution-for this approach potentially results in the masking of an important effect. For instance, an often sought-after effect is to "deny an adversary a coherent operational picture of the battlespace." Using the first approach, the staff cannot determine an appropriate measure, so they redefine the effect to include such things as "destroy enemy ground controlled intercept radars" and "destroy enemy operations centers." Such effects can be measured in terms of "things destroyed," yet such assessments, at a minimum, provide the JFC little insight into the original and intended the adversary that may indicate the success of a particular causal mechanism. 44 In the end, the ideal "measurability analysis" results in defining every effect with both objective measures and subjective indicators. 45 Most certainly, some effects fair poorly in this analysis.
Effects whose scheme fails to meet JFC requirements for usefulness or specificity may be completely discarded or only considered for implementation in cases of robust asset availability. JFCs now have sufficiently defined the promising effects and can begin the process of integrating and synchronizing effects and forces.
In performing this last step, the JFC and staff have also identified assessment requirements-and thus, provided focus to the in-theater collection manager and the Commander's Critical Information Requirements process. Successful and timely operational assessment, however, also requires continuous critical analysis. To meet these demands, the JFC needs an Operational Assessment Team. As Figure 1 indicates, this team performs tasks such as analyzing effects, estimating campaign progress, and monitoring current risk level.
Ultimately, however, this team's purpose is to enhance the operational commander's judgment and decisions about the military campaign's effectiveness and attendant risk in progressing toward the military endstate. To accomplish this purpose, the operational assessment team must develop both an assessment methodology and presentation format effect; such an approach also likely wastes assets on secondary efforts. In contrast, the second method represents a powerful technique. In essence, this method recognizes that an effect not only "does something" to the enemy, it also enables friendly action. For instance, if one wanted to "measure air superiority," rather than counting aircraft destroyed or number of enemy sorties-probably meaningless numbers-one might prefer to measure the degree to which friendly sorties or land and sea maneuver was affected by enemy air. The third technique also works well for some effects. For example, a JFC desires to cut-off an adversary's secure communications (via landline and fiber optics). While difficult to assess objectively or directly, one indicator of success might be the sudden increase in the adversary's use of exploitable communications. 44 Possible sources of indicators are enemy doctrine or the conduct of enemy forces in past conflicts. Planners should exercise caution not to succumb to mirror imaging during the development of indicators. 45 Success or failure in achieving air superiority might be judged in terms of "number of enemy aircraft destroyed" [objective measure], "the degree to which friendly freedom of maneuver is affected by enemy air" [defining the measure in terms of friendly capability], and "the degree to which preparations are being made for airfield abandonment/aircraft retrograde" [subjective indicator].
suitable to the JFC. Developing this assessment and providing recommendations to the JFC represents step three in this process.
Not surprisingly, methodology represents the most challenging element of operational assessment. One fundamental concept, however, underpins this recommendation-a preference for bounding rather than determinism. 46 As the name implies, bounding involves more art than science. Still, three bounding methodologies offer significant promise and provide structure to the assessment process: (1) the confidence/risk framework; (2) the mostlikely, best-case, worst-case framework; and, (3) the probability framework.
The author developed the "confidence/risk approach" in 1997 for use by Joint Force Air Component Commanders (JFACC) as an alternative to the inadequate "percentage-oftask-completion" format then in use-percentages were not suitable for many desired effects.
The "confidence/risk" framework benefited JFACCs by emphasizing the staff's subjective assessment, its confidence level in making such an assessment, and any risk in accepting the staff's judgment. 47 Of all approaches, it is the least rigorous but most responsive.
46 Bounding attempts to define its assessment within a range of possible meaning-that is, the answer lies somewhere between points A and B. Determinism seeks to provide the solution-that is, the answer is A. The bounding method is superior to a deterministic approach for at least two reasons. First, and most obviously, the deterministic or "right answer" approach is wholly infeasible-not only is the assessment process too uncertain to predict exact results, but only the most supremely confident staff could be expected to even try to succeed with such specificity. Second, and more importantly, a bounding methodology, while recognizing the inherent ambiguity of operational assessment, still provides the JFC a useful decision-making framework from which to base his own judgment about a campaign's progress. Moreover, it encourages the JFC and staff to engage in detailed dialogue involving objective and subjective assessments and the rationale for such assessments. 47 Here is an example of the "confidence/risk" method and its presentation format:
The other two methods are analytically-based techniques and vastly more complex.
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Both approaches, in current form, offer excellent decision aids during deliberate planning, but struggle to meet the tempo demands of combat operations. On-going research, however, can make these techniques relevant to JFCs in the near-term. The "most-likely, best-case, worstcase" method examines each action, and-based on knowledge, modeled past experience, and assumptions-predicts the most-likely, best-case (upside), and worst-case (downside or risk)
outcomes. Such an approach has wide application and provides superb decision boundaries for the JFC; it is also intensive in its requirements and dependent on already-modeled data.
The last method-the probability method-has both the most deterministic flavor and narrow applicability of the three approaches. With this approach, each action is assigned a "probability of success" in achieving the desired effect. Unlike the "percentage method" discussed above, however, this method uses detailed modeling in predicting probabilities. It is most useful for effects that target networked enemy systems such as transportation, electrical power, and telecommunications. The probability represents the likelihood an action will achieve the desired level of degradation against these systems. Again, this method is -Northern-most avenue of approach blocked superb in the ideal circumstance; but it is too cumbersome when extensive exploitation of the enemy system is either not modeled or not available. Neither of these later approaches, then, is fully developed. Yet, even in their relative immaturity, these concepts are invaluable in pushing future solutions toward bounding rather than determinism. JFCs should enthusiastically support efforts to advance these analytical frameworks.
Using this bounded analysis, the operational assessment team provides the commander recommendations for campaign design before and during combat operations.
Recommendations during combat necessarily focus on the campaign's progress-"accelerate a phase shift," "change the weight of effort for objective alpha," or "execute a branch plan"
are representative examples. More significantly for this paper, however, is the operational assessment team's influence during campaign design. By considering assessment from a plan's inception and conducting the detailed analysis outlined in this paper, the JFC and staff, through the assessment team, develop considerable insight into actions, causal mechanisms, and effects that support mission accomplishment. Importantly, this process serves to highlight for the JFC and staff the key challenges in sustaining a campaign's progress. What effects are most difficult to achieve? What effects defy assessment?
Why does this make a difference? In this case, the JFC now has a process that spotlights critical uncertainty. In identifying the areas of uncertainty that matter most, the JFC and staff can search for ways to eliminate, mitigate, or plan for-with branches and sequels-this uncertainty before the campaign commences. Prudent options or "workarounds" available to the JFC are: planned operational pauses, comprehensive sequel schemes, and built-in redundancy. Circumstances and JFC preference dictate which approach makes the most sense. 49 All of these "workaround" methods are well-known-rarely, however, are they planned for so early in a campaign design. Accomplishing the process, then, rewards the JFC and staff with a campaign plan that: (1) better anticipates the key uncertainties and potential challenges ahead and (2) plans effectively to overcome or "workaround" the uncertainty. Only by the previous hard work and thinking required by this proposed process can a staff prepare a JFC so well for possible challenges.
Conclusion
The "assessment gap"-the inability to measure effects in war precisely-is often considered the major hurdle preventing progress toward the planning and execution of EBO campaigns. As such, much joint effort focuses on eliminating this gap, pursuing technological solutions as a means to reduce uncertainty. Yet, this paper makes a compelling case that judging the success or failure of effects in war-whether physical, functional, or psychological-defies clarity and certainty; and, if history portends the future at all, it will remain so, even with Herculean technological efforts. More worthwhile, then, are efforts that focus on working through the enduring assessment challenges for the JFC. Several recommendations in this paper can contribute mightily to this goal. Most important among these recommendations are: (1) developing a new operational assessment concept, oriented on the JFC's decision-making needs; (2) changing doctrine so that it encourages assessment 49 A JFC might consider each of the proposed "workarounds"-planned operational pauses, comprehensive sequel schemes, and built-in redundancy-as follows. If a particular effect is of secondary importance, a JFC may elect to execute the military action and allow a significant time period for his staff to judge the effects-that is, a JFC may find an operational pause beneficial before changing his plan. On the other hand, effects of primary importance may require the JFC to be less patient. The JFC and staff, however, benefiting from the detailed pre-execution analysis, would have already developed the backup plan-the sequel-and even decided how long to wait before executing the sequel. Detailed planning for critical uncertainty allows graceful modification to a campaign in execution. In other cases, primary, but highly uncertain effects may force the JFC and staff to build a campaign with planned redundancy. At least two options are available-a JFC may choose to plan multiple "attacks" against the same "target" using the same causal pathway; or alternatively, he may elect
